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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
W. B. RUSSELL,
Plaintiff,

vs.
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY AND
DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Comes now the plaintiff in the above entitled cause
and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a
re-hearing in this cause, for the reasons and upon the
follo~ng grounds:
I

The Court erred in holding that the lower court had
no jurisdiction to order the plaintiff's reinstatement
with defendant company with senority rights unimpaired.
II
The Court erred in holding that the statements in
the transcript relating to plaintiff's illness were hearsay, and should not have been considered by the court
as substantive evidenee of such illness.
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III

The Court erred in holding that the transcript was
improperly considered by the court as the exclusive
evidence of the facts therein testified to.

IV
The Court erred in holding that the lower court
erred in rejecting defendant's evidence, offered at the
trial, that plaintiff was not in fact ill.

v
The Court erred in holding that the provision of
the contract
''No Yardman will he suspended or dismissed
(without first having a fair and impartial hearing and bis guilt established''
did not require the establishment of guilt at the hearing
in order to justify discharg-e.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
The fact ~bat we are here confronted by a Court
united against the position of our client places a double
responsibility upon us as his attorneys. First, the
responsibility of doing our best to protect the interests
of our client. In this we have a present feeling of
having failed miserably. Seeond, the responsibility of
treading the narrow margin between respect for the
court's opinions and honorable disagreement therewith.
The Court has stated that it would be "a travesty
on justiee'' to permit the plaintiff to recover substantial

2
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damages in this action. This obviously by reason of
the fact that the Court is convinced that "good cause"
for discharge in fac.t here existed. This point we are
not disposed here to argue, because the question of
"~hether good cause for discharge did in fact exist is
not in this cas9. This case hinges upon the sole question
of 'Yhether in the determination of the existence of
cause for discharg·e the defendant complied with its
contractual oblig·ations to the plaintiff. What we· here
seek is a reconsideration by the Court of the single
question of whPther this plaintiff was accorded his contractual rights, that is, was Rule 38 of the contract
complied with.
The language of the rule is as follows:
''Article 8, Rule 38. No yardman will · be
suspendfd or dismissed without first having a
fair and impartial hearing and his guilt established. The man whose case is under consideration may be represented by an employee of his
choice, who may be a committeeman, who will be
permittE;d to interrogate witnesses. The accused
and his representative shall be permitted to hear
the testimony of witnesses.''
We emphasize the phrase
''The accused and his representative shall be
permitted to hear the testimony of witnesses.''
for the reason that it is completely ignored by the Court
in its decision, and we cannot help but believe that it
was overlooked. In fact, in quoting the rule in the
opinion, this portion thereof is indicated only by a series
of dots.
3
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The rule on its fac.e requires, so far as we are here
coneerned, five conditions to proper discharge:
(1) A fai1· and impartial hearing;

(2) The right to be represented;
(3) The right to interrogate witnesses;
( 4) The right to hear the testimony of the witnesses;
(5) The establishment of his guilt.
It is upon this question alone that we seek reconsideration. If these conditions existed prior to dis·
charge it would indeed be a travesty on justice to pe-rmit
his recovery.
On the other hand, if they did not, it would be, and
is a· travesty on justice to deny him his rights under the
contract, solemnly entered into by the· Depot Company
on the one hand, and the representative of the mass of
employees on the other, for the benefit of all who come
within its terms.
The decision herein is not limited in scope to the
rights of this single individual.. It lays down a pattern
which affects the employment rights of large numbers.
The blessing here given by the court to the methods
here employed in applying Rule 38 is of concern to
many persons. We respectfully urge that further consideration be given to the meaning of Rule 38, to the
end that not only this plaintiff be accorded the benefit
of its proper interpretation, but an interpretation be
given comme~surate with the rights of all the other
employees subject thereto.

4
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For convenience our views will be presented under
tw·o points of argument:
(1) The Court erred in holding that the· lower court
had no jurisdiction to order the plaintiff's reinstatement \Yith defendant Company with seniority rights unimpaired.

(:3) The Court erred in holding that it was for the
trial rourt to determine whether the· grounds
for digcharge in fact existed, and in this deter..
ruination it was not limited to the transcript of
the heHring·.

ARGUMENT
I

THE, COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
LOWER COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO
ORDER THE PLAINTIFF'S REINSTATEMENT
WITH DEFENDANT COMPANY WITH SENIORITY RIGHTS UNIMP AIRE~D.
Insofar as this case is concerned, what the Court
does on this particular phase of the matter is of little
consequence. However, as a matter· of general policy
we respectfully question the propriety of this holding.
In the lower eourt the plaintiff sought reinstatement. The lov1er court ruled against him on this point.
He did not appeal from this ruling. The correctness
of this ruling was not before this court for approval
or disapproval. In fact, the plaintiff carefully avoided
being drawn into any controversy in this court over the
question of whether the court as a matter of law had
or had not jurisdiction to reinstate.
5
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In view of this situation it seems that this court
might well await the time when this question comes
before it on appeal before taking the momentous step
of judicially determining that the courts of Utah are
without jurisdiction to order reinstatement under agreements such as these, rather than so to hold in this proceeding without benefit of argument pro and con. Other
courts have taken a contrary view.

Coyle v. Erie Ry. Co. (N.J.) 63 A. 2d 702.
Fine v. Plat (Tex.) 150 S.W. 2d 308.
Heasley v. Plasterers' Local No. 31 (Pa .. ) 188 A.
286.

Locomotive Engineers v. Mills (Ariz.) 31 P. 2d 971.
As indicated, these particular observations are of
no moment insofar as the plaintiff is concerned, as he
is bound in this case by the holding of the lower court.
They are purely gratuitous with us, as attorneys, and
directed toward what we conceive to be an erroneous
position upon a point that need not here be decided .
. II

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT
WAS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DETERMINE WJIEiTHER THE GROUNDS FOR DISCHARGE IN FACT EXISTED, AND IN THIS
DETERMINATION IT WAS NOT LIMITED TO
THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING.
We approach this assignment upon the assumption
that the court agrees that the requirement for filling
out Form 153 does not apply in the case of an absence

6
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occasioned by illness; and, hence, if illness were the
cause of the extended absence, a failure- to eomply with
Rule 55(b) Hlh1 fill out the form would not justify a
discharge. The reverse of the proposition is that if
the cause of the absence 'Yere not illness that the defendant had the right to discharge him for his failure to
comply 'Yith th.J rule.
We also observe that the court likewise agreed that
the burden of proving the propriety of the discharge
is on the defendant.
Our position, briefly and bluntly stated, is that if
Rule 38 was complied with prior to discharge, the defendant's right of discharge is full and complete. If
Rule 38 was not complied with, the discharge was wrongful. The court's position, as we interpret the opinion,
is that the right of discharge is dependent upon the
existence in fact of the ground for discharge assigned,
and this is a matter to be determined by the court.·
This latter view disregards, as we see it, the fact that
the parties themselves contracted the conditions for
discharge, and having so contracted it is for the court
only to determine whether those conditions existed neither adding conditions, nor subtracting conditions. We
look, accordingly, to Rule 38, as follows:
''No yardman will be suspended or dismissed
without first having a fair and impartial hearing
and his guilt established. The man whose· case
is under consideration may be represented by an
employee of his choice, who may be a committeeman, who will he permitted to interrogate witnesses. The accused and his representative shall
be permj ted to hear the testimony of witnesses.''

7
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The first ten words are of pnmary importance.
They are:
''No yardman will be suspended or dismissed
without first having * * *. ''
Now what must he "first" have before he may be discharged~ Five things are named, (1) a fair and im- .
partial hearinp-; (2) the right of representation; (3)
the right to interrogate witnesses; ( 4) the right to
hear the testimony of the witnesses; ( 5) the establishment of his guilt.
If those five conditions existed the discharge is
proper. If any thereof did not exist the discharge is
improper. This case is just that simple, and the sole
duty of the court is to determine whether those five
conditions did exist prior to the discharge. And where
does it go to make that determination~ Of necessity it
must go to the record made prior to discharge, and not
to some record, or to some evidence, or to some witnesses first appearing on the scene after discharge,
because those conditions must first exist before a discharge is proper.
Thus it is that we urge that the record of the hearing is the best, and in fact the only evidence of whether
those conditions did exist. Anything less makes a
mockery of the provisions of the Rule. If the employer
may simply pay lip service to the rule by holding a
so-called hearing at which it withholds its evidence, and
after the hearing is closed, secretly interrogate its
witnesses, and develop grounds for discharge (which
admittedly is "'·hat here occurred if there is any evidence
contrary to that appearing In the transcript) then at
8
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least four of the conditions necessary to discharge do not
exist. The employee has not had a fair and impartial
hearing·; he has not had an opportunity to interrogate
the ·witnesses; he has not been permitted to hear the
testimony of \Yitnesses; and his guilt has not been
established at the hearing-.
\\T e turn n O"\Y to some decisions which we believe

support our views.
The "\Yord hearing· has been variously defined, but
running- through all of the decisions is the idea that a
hearing· includes the opportunity to hear as well as
to be heard. In Anthony v. Gilbrath (Ill.) 71 N.E. 2d 184
the court held :
''Hearing is generally understood to mean
a judicial examination of the issues between
the parties whether of law or fact.''

In State v. Milw·aukee (Wis.) 147 N. W. 50, the
court had to decide what was meant by the word ''hearing", and it ruled as follows:
''There are at least three substantial elements of a common-law hearing, (1) the right
to reasonably know the charges or claims preferred, (2) the right to meet such charges by
competent evidence, and (3) the right to be heard
by counsel upon the probative force of the evidence a·iduced by both sides. * * . ''
And in Inland Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B., 109 F. 2d 9:
''A hearing means trial by a tribunal free
of bias and prejudice and imbued with a desire
to accord to the parties equal consideration".
9
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In the case of United States v. Appalachian Electric
Pow'er Co., 107 F. 2d 769, the government attempted to
enjoin the defendant from the erection of a hydroelectric dam. As a part of the action it was maintained
that the Commission had ruled against the plaintiff as
a result of a hearing. The Court, at page 792, said:
''If the public hearing granted by the Commission in 1926 and above referred to is to be
regarded as a. hearing in the sense of due process,
and therefore the defendant is to be affected by
the finding of the Commission that the interests
of interstate commerce would be affected by the
,dam, we could hardly conclude that the finding
was based on substantial evidence, in view of the
fact that the only evidence then introduced was
the report and opinion of Gen. Taylor to the contrary. At the hearing counsel for the defendant
inquired whether further or other evidence was
to be considered hy the Commission, and if so,
indicated his desire to be informed of it. Nothing
was then said to indicate that the Commission
desired or would eonsider other evidence. It is
now said by counsel for the Commission that
it did have available, and must have considered,
other information upon the subject to he found
in various official reports, public documents,
and Acts of Congress, many of which were offered in evidence by the plaintiff in this case.
But as these matters were not brought to the
attention of the Company at the hearing, it is
not pereeived how they could he regarded as
evidence affecting it in the sense of due process. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 227 U.S. 88,
91, 33, S. Ct., 185, 57 L.Ed. 431: Morgan v. United
States, 304 U. S. 1, 14, 15, 19, 58 S. Ct. 773, 99,
82 L.Ed 1129. For the same reasons we do not
think that the subsequent declaration or finding

10
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of the Commission on October 12, 1932, can be
reg·arded as in any \Yay affecting the rights of the
defendant, because it was made ex parte without
notice or hearing. It is not meant to suggest that
the Commission at any time intentionally proceeded arbitrarily, or without proper regard to
the rights of the Dam Company, or that its proceeding· \Yas inappropriate to the 'investigation'
directed by the Act; but only that its finding, to
the extent based on information obtained informally and ex parte, and not brought out at
the notified hearing where it would be subject
to cross--examination and possible refutation, cannot properly he considered as consistent with due
process, if sought to he made conclusive on the
defendant. The reasonable assumption would
seem to be that the procedure followed was adopted as appropriate to an 'investigation' by the
Commission, rather than a 'hearing' 'vith the
legal implications thereof. See Norwegian Nitrogen Products Company v. United States, 288
U. S. 294, 317, 53 S. Ct., 350, 77 L. Ed. 796-."
In Coyle v. Erie Ry. Co. (N. J.), 63 A. 2d 702 the
court had before it a contractual provision that did not
contain a provision for a hearing, but it did contain a
provision permitting the employee to examine the evidence of the employer. The. New Jersey court said:
''Although the language of the quoted rule
does not provide for a hearing in the technical
sense of a court proceeding, there can he no
doubt that the terms of the rule were not complied wii h. The provision for notice 'in writing,
in advance, of the charge and time of investigation' coupled with 'the right to be represented
by the duly accredited representative' clearly

11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

imply such notices will give the employees a fair
opportunity to get in touch with their representatives and to prepare their defense. The
one day'[~ notice given on October 15th to appear
on October 16th is obviously inadequate. Schlenk
v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, 62 A. 2d
380, 381, decided by this court in an opinion filed
December 6, 1948, not yet officially reported. The
statements of Hastings and Whaley were read
to the complainants, but neither was present
despite the fact that the complainants asked
why H~.stings was not there. They obviously
desired to question Hastings and it would seem
that thty were fairly entitled to do so either
under the contract provision giving them the
right to 'have witnesses of their own choice * * *
p-resent or under the clause providing that
'evidence pertaining to the case will be made
available'. The defendant railroad has failed
to comply with the terms of the contract with the
Brotherhood in the investigation.''

The court then concluded:
''The decree below will be reversed and a
judgment will he entered, directing the reinstatement of the complainants as of October 11,
1947, 'vith back pay, retirement and pension
rights, and enjoining the defendant from conducting an investigation of the charges against
the complainants except in conformity with the
terms of the Brotherhood contract.''
A related field of inquiry is found in cases growing
out of the discharge of employees covered by civil service statutes. The distinction, which is without a legal
difference, is that there the statutes condition the right
of discharge, whereas here the contract sets forth those
-c.onditions.

12
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\\.,..e refer, for example, to the case of Roberson v.
City of Rome (Ga.) 25 S. E. 2d 925:
"It is evident that the hearing contemplated
by the act is not a common-law or a criminal
proceeding. But while it is not a common-law or
criminal proceeding it is of a judicial character
and must be so conducted. Stiles v. Lowell, 233
Mass. 17 4, 123 N.E~. 615, 4 A.L.R. 1365; State v.
~IcColl, 127 ~linn. 155, 149, N.W. 11. The power of
the Civil Service Board of the City of Rome is derived from the act creating it, and it has no power
not granted by the act, and in performing the
functions it must do so in terms of the act. 'The
full performace of all conditions established by
the civil service laws is an essential prerequisite
to the jurisdiction of the removing body over
the subject matter of the removal of an officer
(citing Stiles v. L·owell, supra, and Thomas v
Lowell, 227 Mass. 116, 116 N. E. 497), and w·here
there is no substantial compliance with the statutory procedure, an order of removal is a ri!Ullity.' 43 C. J. 679." (Italics added)
And Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners.,
(Calif.) 160 P 2d 816, the court said:
''The rule is firmly established that if by
statute an officer or civil service employee may
not be removed or discharged except for cause,
the clear implication is that there be afforded
an opportunity for a full hearing to accomplish
his removal; that unless the statute expressly
negatives the necessity of a hearing, common
fairness and justice compel the inclusion of such
a requirement hy implication. See Bannerman
v. Boyle. 160 Cal. 197, 116 P. 732; Carrol v. California Horse Racing Board, 16 Cal. 2d 164, 105
P. 2d 110; Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641, 119 P.

13
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1080; Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Francis, 79
Cal. App. 383, 249 P. 539; People v. Bailey, 30
Cal App. 581, 158 P. 1036; Scott v. Donahue, 83
Cal. .App. 126. 269 P. 455; Abrams v. Daugherty,
60 Cal. App. 297, 212 P. 942; Boyd v. Pendegast,
57 Cal. App. 504, 207 P. 713; 99 A. L. R. 336.
Thus it is clear that the charter, hy prohibiting
removal except for cause, impliedly requires a
hearing. There is nothing in the charter which
negatives that implication. True, it is provided
in section 112 (a) that the board shall investigate the grounds for discharge. But an investigation is not necessarily inconsistent with a hearing. It may mean the same thing. See Luellen
v. City of Aberdeen, 20 Wash. 2594, 148, 148 P.
2d 849; Matter of Gilchrist, 130 Misc. 456, 224
N. Y. S. 210."

'' * * *. The term investigation does not detract from the fact that a hearing is required
with all that the term implies.''
The· Utah Civil Service Statute (Seetion 15-9-21,
U. C. A., 1943) provides:
''All persons in the classified civil service
may .he removed from office or employment by
·the head of the department for mis-conduct, incompetency or failure to perform his duties or
failure to observe properly the rules of the department, but subject to appeal by the aggrieved
party to the civil service commission. .Any person discharged may 'vithin five days from the
issuing by· the head of the department of the
order discharging him appeal therefrom to the
civil service commission; which shall fully bear
and determine the matter. The discharged person shall be entitled to appear in person and to
have counsel and a public hearing. The finding

14
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and decision of the civil service commission upon
such hearing shall be certified to the head of the
departrrtent from 'vhose order the appeal is taken,
and shall be final, and shall forth,vith be enforced
and follo,ved by him.''
In the case of Erkman. v. Civil Service Commission,
114 Utah ~:28, 198 P. 2d 238, this court had no difficulty
in confining the court to the record before the Commission, and held:
'·The judgment of the Distric.t Court was
based s )lely on the record of the hearing before
the Civi: Service Commission on plaintiff's appeal to that commission from his discharge by
the Chief of Police. Since our action on this appeal 'vill likewise be based altogether on that
same r~cord, we may treat this for the purpose
of simpHcity as if it were a direct appeal from
the defendant eommission to this eourt, although
technically the question before us is whether the
district court erred in refusing to set aside the
order of the defendant commission. But that
question depends upon whether the defendant
commission failed regularly to pursue its author~
ity, or, in other words, whether it acted arbitrarily, or, stated still another way, without basis
or reason.''
And finally we refer to the case of Buster v. M. &
St. P. & P. R. Co., 195 F. (2) 73, wherein the plaintiff
sued for damages for a claimed improper discharge.
The contractual provision there involved was not dissimilar from ours. It read:
''Defendant's yardman or switch tenders
taken out of service or censored for eause shall
be notified by the company of the reason therefor
15
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and shall he given a hearing within five days
after being taken out of service. * * * yardmen
* * * shall have the right to be present and to have
an employee of their choice at hearings and
investip:ations to hear all oral and read all written testimony and bring out any facts in connection with the case. ''
On appeal, the Illinois court held:
'' r~rhe sole question involved in this appeal
is whether or not the plaintiff was given a 'fair
and impartial hearing' on the charge that he
viola ted the company rules.''
That, in a sense, is the point we are here making.
As evidenced by the foregoing decisions, the view of the
.courts is that' fi "fair and impartial hearing" implies
.the right to hear, the right to be heard, the right to exa. mine witnesses, the right to have the witnesses present,
the right to be apprised of the evidence against him, and
the· right to argue its probative force.
In the present contract it was not, in part at least,
left to any implication to he drawn from the word hearing, because, in addition to providing for a "fair and
impartial hearing'' with all of its implications, Rule
38 specifically spelled out what the parties had in mind,
namely, the right to interrogate the witnesses, the right
. to have the employee's guilt established.
This court in its opinion says :
"It is true that in a proper cases the transcript of the hearing might itself reveal unjust
discharge. Thus, if it showed conclusively that
the plaintiff was not accorded his rights under
the eontract; that he was not given adequate
notice, or was not given opportunity to be heard

16
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or to be represented by an employee of his choice,
the discharge ""'ould be wrongful, because according the employee such rights is, under the
rontract, a condition precedent to discipline or
discharge. But that is not the ease before us.''
\\Te eannot reeoncile that holding with the ultimate

decision. Here it is established that the plaintiff was
discharged upon the basis of evidence not adduced at
the hearing - t~at the defendant accepted and acted
upon testimony or statements of witnesses made outside
the hearing - that the plaintiff was never apprised of
the nature of the evidenee or who gave it - and that
he \Yas not given an opportunity to refute it or argue
its probative fC'rce.
Wherein is there a fair and impartial hearing in
that type of p~oceeding~ Wherein is there any compliance of the rule that requires, as a condition to discharge, that the employee shall have the right to interrogate the witnesses and be permitted to hear their
testimony~

The court recognizes that the transcript of the
hearing on its face may show improper discharg·e, as
where he was not given adequate notice, or an opportunity to be heard, or to be represented by an employee
of his choice. But why so limit it~ The parties themselves did not. They further provided that the employee
at the hearing should have the right to interrogate the
witnesses and hear the evidence against him. Why is
it less important that he know the evidence against him
than that he be represented by a fellow employee~ Why
is it less important to the employee that witnesses be
permitted to testify against him in secret than it is
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that he have adequate notiee of the hearing~ Aren't
all of these c.onditions equally important, and actually
if an.y are absent hasn't the employee had less than a
fair and impartial hearing~ We can't conceive that
this Court intends to hold that the requirements for
a fair and impartial hearing are met where evidence
against the employee is developed and determined 1n
secret, and a discharge predieated thereon.
Neither does it suffice to say that the trial court
will eorrect the matter if injustice was done and the
employee discharged when no grounds therefore existed.
The injustiee arises through the breach of the c.onditions of the contract, which provides that no employee
shall be discharged until he first shall have a fair
and impartial hearing, etc. If the employer can first
discharge, and then try out de novo in the courts the
question of the propriety of the diseharge, the provisions of Rule 38 are meaningless and the benefits to
the employee intended thereby nonexistent. Certainly
neither the employees nor the employer who negotiated
this contract intended any such result, nor can the language· they used justify any such interpretation.
To some extent the responsibility for what we believe to be the erroneous interpretation of Rule 38 may
lie with us for our oversight in our original brief in
omitting to set forth the whole of Rule 38, rather than
stopping with the words "and his guilt established".
However, the whole of the rule appeared in the defendant's ·brief, including that portion relating to the right
to interrogate witnesses and hear the testimony of
witnesses, which we now deem of particular importance,

18
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in vie"~ of the apparent holding of the court that the
right to a ''fair and impartial hearing'' in and of itself
does not include these latter rights.
Our only explanation for this dereliction is that it
never occurred to us that this court would hold that the
plaintiff had had a fair and impartial hearing, where
there \Yas a taking- of evidence against him in secret
and the predicating of his discharge on that secret evidence. It is not, ho\YeYer, too late to right the wrong,
and reg·ardless of what this court may say in regard to
what constitutes a. fair hearing·, the contract here spelled
out in black and white that before the plaintiff could be
discharged he would have the right to hear and see the
,,~itnesses against him, and admittedly this right wa.s not
accorded him.
On the question of the measure of damages we yield
in this case ,,jthout further argument. However, we
believe that th~ right to back pay is inextricably woven
in to the right to reinstatement, and that they go hand
in glove. In other words, if there is the right to reinstatement, and jurisdiction to grant it, there is a coequal right to hack pay, and as heretofore indicated,
we trust the court will not in this case foreclose the matter of the court's jurisdiction to order reinstatement,
because the pro of the proposition has not been adequately presented or argued.
One other matter, and then we are going to fold
our tent. The Court apparently gives considerable
importance to the fact· that the agent for plaintiff in
his bids for reinstatement finally himself concluded
that plaintiff had testified falsely as to his illness. We
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cannot help but believe that in so holding the court
has reached the same tortured conclusion as to the meaning of Mr. McDaniel's letter as the defendant asserted;
but, regardless of that, there are two complete answers
to the conclusion which we believe the court has overlooked. The first is that if the agent did become so
convinced it must have been upon that same secret testi-mony which is the nub of this whole law suit.
The second is, that McDaniel's whole interest in
this matter was in regard to reinstatement. McDaniel
never came int., the matter at all except insofar as plaintiff's request that he be· reinstated was being processed
by the defendant. The letter on its face relates to
reinstatment alone. We do not now· care about rein. .
statement. WP: gave up on that when the trial court
ruled against us. Yet despite the fact that reinstatement is not and never has been involved in this appeal,
we are constantly c.onfronted with its apparition, and
the defendant's denial to plaintiff of a fair and impartial hearing is blessed by the reminder that he had no
right to reinstatement.
We sincere]y wish that the court would throw the
question of reinstatement out the window - discard it
permanently insofar as this case is concerned, onee and
for all - and decide the plaintiff's rights as we believe
they should be decided, solely upon the question of
'
whether the defendant
breached its contract in not first
complying with Rule 38 before making the discharge
effective. upon this issue, which is and can be the only
pertinent one, questions of whether the plaintiff was
a liar or not, of whether he was a good worker or a poor
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one, of ""hether he should in fact have been discharged
for a dozen different reasons, become immaterial. There
may baYe been a hundred good reasons for dismissing·
him from ser,~iee, but the defendant contracted with him
that before ·it 'Would discharge him it would give- him
a fair and impartial bearing, permit him to interrogate
the 'vitnesses, to hear the testimony, and in that manner
establish his guilt. Unless the court can and will say
that these conditions, so embodied in Rule 38, are contrary to public policy and so void, then the defendant is
bound by them, and the only question is whether they
""ere complied with.
CONCLUSION
It is upon this question and upon this question alone
that the plaintiff seeks to be reheard. The issues are
momentous. The rights involved are multitudinous.
We beg of the court not to permit the decision to stand
in its present form. Far better it be, if the court so
wills, that the plaintiff be summarily cut off upon some
other ground, Bs for example laches or waiver as urged
by the defendant, than that it be said that he was here
given a fair and impartial hearing in accordance with
the judicial requirements of this enlightened state.
The real travesty on justice in this case is not in
the award of damages pointed to by the Court, but rather
in the subordination of the rights of plaintiff under
this contract to the cavalier treatment given by the
defendant. It exists in the approval voiced to the conclusions reached by the defendant, and in the blessing
accorded to the manner of the termination of plaintiff's
employment.
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Particularly it exists in permitting the defendant,
a great and wealthy corporation, to violate and ignore
the plain import of its obligations under the contract
and to deprive the plaintiff, by that farce they called
a hearing, of the job security so zealously sought to be
safeguarded by the provisions of Rule 38.
Plato argued that the great and worthy had a duty
to the public proportionate to these gifts. We do not
so approach the matter, but do argue that the defendant's employees have the right to require it to live up
to its contractual obligations to them, and the right to
expect the courts to enforce those obligations, painful
though it may be.
Mr. Justice Henriod states the principle here involved in a way that cannot be improved upon in the
case of Creamer v. 0. U. R. & D. Co., Utah, 242 P. 2d 575,
as follows :
"Our sympathies extend to plaintiff, but
we must subordinate it, if in the honoring of it,
we uproot the principle that there can be no recovery if no legal duty has been violated."
The converse of this of necessity is true. Sympathies must be subordinated if in honoring them violence is done to the principle that there shall he no wrong
without a remedy. Plaintiff here was wronged when
he was discharged without first having a fair and impartial hearing, without having the opporunity of interrogating the witnesses against him, without having
the right to hear their testimony, and without his guilt
being establish6d at the hearing.
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\\Te sinrer-?ly apologize if anything we here have·

said seerns offensiYe to anyone. Certainly it was not
so intended. Presenting the arguments on petitions
for rehearing constitutes the most difficult task the
"'Titer ever undertakes, because they of necessity are
directed again~t the logic and reasoning of members
of the court. \\" e can, however, honestly disagree without such disagreement militating in any way against
out respect for those w·ho judge us, and it is in that
spirit that this petition and brief is submitted.
Respectfully submitted,

HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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